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Abstract
The present paper uses empirical data to examine the extent to which endogenous and exogenous factors shape
routine dynamics. We find that action patterns for carrying out the task we study are typically not stable over time and
that most endogenous and exogenous factors can both increase and decrease the sequential variety of these action
patterns, depending on the degree of formal authority applied to a routine. Our findings point to an important aspect of
routine dynamics, namely, their strategic root cause: By defining the degree of discretion of those who carry out the
routine, organization designers can actively manipulate when routine dynamics occur, what sources they have, and
whether or not they are useful for the organization. We discuss implications for theory and practice.
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Abstract 
The present paper uses empirical data to examine the extent to which endogenous and exogenous 
factors shape routine dynamics. We find that action patterns for carrying out the task we study 
are typically not stable over time and that most endogenous and exogenous factors can both 
increase and decrease the sequential variety of these action patterns, depending on the degree of 
formal authority applied to a routine. Our findings point to an important aspect of routine 
dynamics, namely, their strategic root cause: By defining the degree of discretion of those who 
carry out the routine, organization designers can actively manipulate when routine dynamics 
occur, what sources they have, and whether or not they are useful for the organization. We 
discuss implications for theory and practice. 
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1) Introduction 
Organizational routines have long been considered central to understanding organizations, how 
they accomplish their tasks, and their performance outcomes (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organizational routines refer to actors jointly 
accomplishing interdependent tasks in ways that are stable over time.1 This stability, which is a 
hallmark of the traditional conception of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cohen et al., 1996), is 
challenged by recent research that identifies variation between one iteration and the next 
(Pentland & Rueter, 1994; Pentland, 2003a, 2003b). Interestingly, routines can change, not just 
due to exogenous pressures for change (Gersick & Hackman, 1990) but even without such 
pressures, as the participants in routines can and do also change them endogenously (Feldman, 
2000, 2003; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Rerup & 
Feldman, 2011).  
Even despite this active stream of research on organizational routines and their change, 
the number of empirical studies that examine stability and change in routines is still surprisingly 
small (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011: 447). Recent research has pointed out that the 
organizational context within which routines are embedded is paramount for understanding the 
performance and change of routines (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011: 442), because some 
essential features of organizational context have not adequately been considered in depth yet. 
Even ‘studies in the practice perspective [which] are so concerned with situated action .. 
                                                            
1 While several authors consider organizational routines to refer to recurrent interaction patterns and sequences of 
actions (Pentland et al., 2011), the general term organizational routines refera more broadly to what generates these 
sequences of actions, for instance, the ‘organizational dispositions to energize conditional patterns of behavior 
within organizations, involving sequential responses to cues that are partly dependent on social positions in the 
organization’ (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010: 140). In this article, sequences of actions are in the focus. When we use 
the term ‘routines’ to point to these sequences of actions, it is only for convenience and as a short-hand. 
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sometimes ignore fundamental organizational attributes that exist above the level of the routine 
but nonetheless affect its performance’ (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011: 443). In our 
study we shed light on the influence of one fundamental but neglected organizational attribute, 
namely hierarchical authority and its role in organizational routines. While such an influence has 
long been stipulated, extant research has not yet explored this link, leaving a significant gap in 
extant research. In their seminal work on organizational routines, Nelson & Winter (1982: 109) 
pointed out that ‘ordinarily, .. control systems … leave individual members with substantial areas 
of behavioral discretion’ in how to carry out tasks. Other streams of research have also noted that 
a typical feature of many organizations is to leave the execution of tasks in the hand of those who 
the tasks are allocated to; this happens especially for recurring, routine tasks. Aghion & Tirole 
(1997) propose that while the superior holds the formal authority concerning the task, the actual 
decision rights concerning how to carry out a task are often de facto delegated to lower level 
agents who execute the task and therefore hold what Aghion & Tirole (1997) call real authority. 
Superiors intervene to decide in exceptional cases (Bittel, 1964), but mostly simply engage in 
rubberstamping (Rivkin & Siggelkow 2003). This common feature of organizations raises some 
major questions for routine research: In the absence of the exercise of formal authority by 
superiors, the agents who carry out a task have discretion, or real authority, and can adapt the 
routine due to a myriad of possible motivations (cf. Feldman, 2000; 2003; Feldman & Pentland, 
2003). When superiors employ their formal authority to enforce rules and to shape organizational 
routines (Knott, 2001), the discretion of the agents carrying out the routine is limited and change 
in routines is predominantly explained by the exercise of formal authority.  
The connection between types of authority and routines has, surprisingly, not been made 
so far. In what follows, we provide empirical evidence that sheds light on the role of formal and 
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real authority for explaining changes in organizational routines. Our findings confirm prior 
research by showing that discretion is paramount for understanding organizational routines and 
their stability. We thereby add to emerging theory on the role of decision rights for 
organizational routines and their stability and change. We find that how managers specifically 
define formal and real authority is more important for understanding routine dynamics than 
many exogenous and endogenous factors. On this basis, we propose a research agenda that puts 
an emphasis on micro level structures within routines.  
The paper structures as follows: the subsequent section reports prior research and 
develops hypotheses, section three presents data and measures, section four results and section 
five discussion and conclusion.  
 
2) Change of organizational routines: Prior research and hypothesis development 
Prior research has identified two different types of sources of change in routines: exogenous and 
endogenous sources (Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Feldman, 2000). While there are several 
environmental influences on the change of routines, such as external shocks (Gersick & 
Hackman, 1990), in the context of business firms, top-down management intervention is an 
important form of exogenous influence on routines and change of routines (Becker et al., 2005, 
Pentland & Feldman, 2008). Managers can therefore be conceived as a source of exogenous 
change in organizational routines. Prior research points to three ways in which managers can 
influence routines: (a) by exercising their formal authority to enforce that tasks are carried out in 
a particular way, e.g. by establishing priorities, deadlines, etc. (Knott, 2001); (b) by directly 
engaging in restructuring processes on a micro-level, such as in business process reengineering 
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(Davenport and Short, 1990; Hammer, 1990; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Davenport, 1993; 
Grover & Malhotra, 1997; Hung, 2006; Peng et al., 2008); or (c) by exercising their authority to 
change the structure of the underlying technology, e.g. more standardized products (Baldwin & 
Clark, 2000).  
Recent research has also argued that routines are capable of endogenous change because 
they are generative systems with an internal structure (Feldman and Pentland 2003; Pentland et 
al., 2011; Turner & Rindova, 2012). The key to endogenous change in routines is to include 
routine participants in the analysis of routines, i.e., the actual people who perform the routines 
and who should be the most salient driver of endogenous change (Feldman, 2000: 611; Feldman, 
2003; Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 99).  
In what follows, we develop hypotheses on the variables identified as important 
exogenous and endogenous drivers of change. 
 
2.1) Exogenous influences on routine dynamics 
2.1.1) Hierarchical authority 
Arguably, one of the most important exogenous interventions for changing routines is 
management intervention. Of particular interest is usually the minimization of variation in 
reoccurring organizational action patterns. Due to their hierarchical authority, managers can 
enforce particular ways of accomplishing work in firms, and put in place mechanisms such as 
incentives and sanctions to enforce the envisioned ways of accomplishing work (Mintzberg, 
1979). Prior research has thus argued that in order to understand routines, hierarchy and authority 
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should be considered (Gavetti, 2005) by investigating the relation between authority and routines 
(Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011: 437). Lazaric & Raybaut (2005), e.g., consider how 
hierarchical pressure influences the efforts exercised by different groups that participate in a 
routine. Zbaracki & Bergen (2010) noted that an individual’s hierarchical position may influence 
how a routine is enacted.  
 An important finding of prior literature is that agents who participate in a routine and 
who make decisions regarding how and when to execute tasks typically also have some control 
over the task, simply by the real authority that exists in any delegation that involves discretion 
(Aghion & Tirole 1997). For most typical routine tasks this means that the average participant in 
a routine has effective control (real decision authority), while the formal authority is held by a 
manager (Aghion & Tirole 1997). Managers only intervene when there are exceptions (Bittel, 
1964), but even then, most of the time stick to rubberstamping the decisions taken by their 
subordinates (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). On the other hand, if the formal authority holder 
decides to intervene, her managerial intervention can have a powerful influence on the stability 
of a routine. We therefore hypothesize:  
H1: The more formal authority, rather than real authority, determines the degree of 
discretion within a routine, the more stable the routine is over time.  
 
2.1.2  Quality management  
Quality management, as a “philosophy or an approach to management” (Sousa & Voss, 2002:  
92) focuses on a set of management practices including process management and improvement. 
To achieve process improvement, quality management and related frameworks have developed a 
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range of tools and approaches to systematically tackle different sources of (unwanted) variation 
in processes or routines. Two important sources of such variation are unwanted errors, and doing 
something that is wasteful or that the customer does not want. Approaches such as six sigma, 
kaizen and continuous improvement provide tools and mechanisms for error detection, root-
cause-analysis, and eradicating the error causes. Techniques such as the prioritization of 
processes to assure that the most value-creating processes are privileged, and for eliminating 
double-work and waste such as ‘muda’ in the Toyota Production System, provide concrete 
examples for reducing the variation in processes (Grover & Malhotra, 1997). We hypothesize: 
H2: The less (more) developed quality management, the more (less) prevalent routine 
dynamics are to be expected. 
 
2.1.3 Standardization of products  
One of the main goals of business process reengineering (and related literatures) is to minimize 
variation by standardizing or homogenizing inputs (Hammer & Champy, 1993). This can be 
done e.g. by capturing customer complaints using pre-established categories or in the case of 
physical products, establishing standardized interfaces between the different modules of the 
product (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Standardizing inputs allows minimizing variance in the 
subsequent processes that deal with these inputs, for instance responding to customer inquiries 
(Pentland & Rueter, 1994) or paying invoices (Pentland et al., 2011). To the extent that many 
customer inquiries can be bundled in product categories, standardizing the product and its 
components should lead to less routine dynamics in the processes for each product type.  
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H3: The less (more) developed product modularity, the more (less) prevalent routine 
dynamics are to be expected 
 
2.2 Endogenous influences on routine dynamics  
2.2.1 Individuals as endogenous source of routine dynamics 
In her influential paper, Feldman (2000: 614) argues that ‘routines are performed by people who 
think and feel and care. … Their actions are motivated by will and intention. They create, resist, 
engage in conflict, aquiesce to domination. All of these forces influence the enactment of 
organizational routines and create in them a tremendous potential for change’. Building on this 
insight, research has identified mechanisms by which routine participants can generate 
endogenous change. Feldman (2000: 611, 620) argues that when outcomes of action fall short of 
ideals (e.g., do not produce the intended outcomes), agents reflect on and react to those 
outcomes, e.g. by making efforts to change or “repair” routines to attain these ideals or by 
expanding them to take advantage of new possibilities. Feldman and Pentland (2003: 113) 
identify mechanisms of guiding, referring, and accounting by which participants in routines can 
create variations that other participants recognize as legitimate. Routines thus change 
endogenously as people react to outcomes of prior iterations of a routine or retain changes 
introduced by other participants in a routine (Feldman, 2000; 2003; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Pentland et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Through mechanisms such as these, one and the same 
routine can generate many different patterns (Pentland et al., 2010: 29). Therefore, a ‘tendency 
toward endogenous change is a natural part of routines’ (Pentland et al., 2011: 1381), and the 
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individuals who carry out routines are considered important drivers of such variability of 
routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). We thus hypothesize:  
H4a: Individuals have an impact on routine dynamics. 
 
2.2.2 Individuals do not have an impact on routine dynamics 
A strong and long-standing counter-position to H4a exists in the literature, i.e. the notion that 
individuals do not have an impact on routine dynamics. This counter-position is built on the 
notion that organizational routines are built from individual-level habits (Cohen & Bacdayan, 
1994; Cohen, 2007; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010; cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982, ch. 4 and 5) that 
are, similarily to routines, characterized by stability (Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Marteau et al., 
2012; Neal et al., 2012).    
From this perspective, it would appear unlikely that individuals – the carriers of stable habits – 
would lead to routine dynamics, at least as long as little is known about the process by which 
individual habits aggregate to organizational routines. As a recent review points out, ‘the link 
between individual skills and organizational routines has not been examined systematically and 
is referred to mainly via the analogy that routines are “habit-like” or “skill-like” organizational-
level entities’ (Salvato & Rerup, 2011: 474). Scholars thus point to a gap with regard to 
knowledge about the relationship of individual habits and organizational routines (Salvato & 
Rerup, 2011; Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011).  
The idea that individuals do not have an impact on routine dynamics is consistent with the 
empirical observation that routines can resist turnover of individuals involved in the routine 
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(Winter, 1991). As Winter (1991: 187) writes, ‘organizations seem to have a remarkable 
tendency to keep interaction patterns stable, even in the face of continuing turnover in the 
population of individuals displaying the pattern’. We thus hypothesize: 
H4b: Individuals do not have an impact on routine dynamics  
 
3) Data and measures  
Data  
We gathered 5 years of data capturing the specific action sequences of a routine that was 
employed for dealing with customer claims in a manufacturing firm that produces ventilation 
systems mostly for commercial purposes.2 Claims include any type of customer inquiry in the 
context of after-sales, mostly concerning malfunctioning or broken products. The reason for 
selecting this routine for our research was that it is an operational business process that is 
frequently occurring with about 45 claims per week. While this routine is repetitive, it is not fully 
automated, not optimized using advanced production control and thus still leaves some discretion 
for individuals to influence how they execute their task. In addition, this routine is constant in the 
sense that the firm did neither introduce completely new products nor change the technology (IT 
systems) used for executing the routine during the observation period; it also did not make major 
changes to the employees that were working on the claims. The documentation of the routine’s 
action sequences was made possible because the firm had an IT system which documented the 
routine in detail and allowed us to examine its dynamics. What makes the dataset particularly 
                                                            
2
 The firm is a mid-size company with approximately 500 employees. It is vertically integrated and manufactures its 
products in-house. While the distribution is global, most of the firm’s customers are located in Europe.  
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interesting is the fact that the time of observation can easily be divided in time periods in which 
the degree of formal authority exercised in the claim process varied significantly: the claim 
process was first carried out with a low and then with a high degree of formal authority. The 
roles that management played in monitoring, supervising and changing the routine were 
distinctively different in different time periods and allow for the examination of a naturally 
occurring intervention that includes features of a natural experiment (Kogut & Zander, 2000; 
Gittell et al., 2008), i.e. most of the underlying parameters remained unchanged while displaying 
variation in our areas of interest. This provides the occasion to identify the impact of changes in 
the degree of hierarchical authority employed on the routine dynamics.  
One of the authors was employed as part-time employee in the firm’s quality management 
department for a period of six months in 2009. During that time we gathered internal documents 
such as workflow charts and organizational diagrams, and we carried out a series of semi-
structured interviews with the employees of the quality department who were in charge of the 
claim process. In addition, we carried out participant observation to understand the claim process 
in detail, including the organization’s decision structures and related routines, as well as the 
individual behaviours and habits of all participating employees. This data provided us with a rich 
understanding of the organization’s overall setting and the specificities within the routine.  
The main dataset entails a total of 11,560 claims which all consist of action sequences that entail 
the initial acceptance of the customer inquiry, the assignment and execution of various claim 
handling procedures and the final closing of the customer claim. A claim starts when customers 
that have an after-sales inquiry contact their sales representative. Reasons for inquiries that may 
result in claims include malfunctioning products, incomplete deliveries, or technical problems in 
the daily operation. Given that many of the firm’s products are installed at the customers’ 
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facilities, sales representatives or service engineers often have to visit the customer site in order 
to assess the problem or directly repair the product. After an inquiry is accepted as a claim, the 
sales representative needs to fill out a service report by officially opening a claim in the firm’s IT 
system.3 This report includes information concerning time spent during a customer visit, the 
distance driven to the customer, failure reasons, the sales representative involved, etc., which 
employees have to fill out in the software in order to complete a claim’s service report. After a 
claim is opened, the claim is documented within the organization and further actions are taken as 
the claim progresses. Once all necessary actions are completed the claim is closed. A list of all 
possible actions can be found in Table 1 and a screenshot from the software system can be found 
in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here 
Changes in the degree of hierarchical authority employed to the routine divide the dataset in four 
distinct time periods, three of which we use for the analysis:4  
Period 1: Before 2003, the claim process was quite primitive. The claim procurement between 
stages was based on paper notes that were internally shipped between the different departments. 
It often happened that some of them were delayed or simply lost. It was also very difficult to 
locate a claim after it entered the firm, e.g. when a customer approached the firm a second time. 
Because of that an analysis of the claim process was nearly impossible for management and only 
                                                            
3
 Various scholars consider event logs systems as valuable tools for systematic analyses. For instance, van der Aalst 
and Weijters (2004) state that extraction of information from event logs can reveal real execution of business 
processes. 
4
  We use this approach with different time periods following the line of work of March et al. (2000), who also 
distinguished several historical periods that were characterized by important organizational differences (in the case 
of March et al., 2000, different patterns of environmental and university change).  
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very limited formal authority was dedicated to the claim routine. Due to the lack of any 
possibility to monitor the claims process, period one was therefore characterized by a nearly 
complete lack of the application of formal authority. In period one, the claim process was 
effectively in the hands of those who executed it, and in doing so they exercised real authority 
(Aghion & Tirole, 1997).   
Period 2. To deal with the problems and better monitor in the claims process mentioned above, 
the firm implemented a new IT system at the end of 2003. After its introduction the IT system 
remained unchanged during our observation period which makes data easy to compare. Between 
2003 and 2007, the underlying logic of the routine remained unchanged since management was 
mostly monitoring and intervening only in extreme cases. One reason for this was that the claim 
process was officially taking place in the sales and the quality management department, and both 
managers, while jointly having formal authority over the routine, dedicated their authority to 
other more pressing topics. Hence, the claim routine received limited formal authority and 
mostly operated based on the routine participants’ real authority, who completed the task based 
on the historic account and their personal preferences.  
Period 3. At the beginning of 2007, the quality manager left the company. At the same time, the 
company’s management concluded that the claim process should simply continue operating 
without direct management monitoring, i.e. the claim process was considered to be routinized 
and self-sustaining. A first consequence of this decision was that claim duration increased since 
none of the employees involved viewed themselves as process owner, especially when unclear 
situations emerged and exception handling was necessary. This became even more significant 
when the firm, at the same time, implemented minor changes to some of the product categories. 
An interviewee explained, ‘unfortunately, from the end of 2006 [the firm] was suffering from the 
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absence of a quality manager, who had been the founder of this process and its coordinator. Our 
sales were increasing and the claim process needed more attention.’ This situation was reinforced 
by the manager of the sales department, who believed that the original division of responsibility 
between him and the quality manager would remain. As a result, all routine participants who 
were not working under his supervision were effectively operating without direct formal 
authority.5 Overall, the claim routine was now completely in the hands of those who executed it, 
and formal authority was never intervening.  
In February 2008, a new quality and process manager was hired. During the first months, one of 
her focus areas was to assess the situation on the various business processes, including the claim 
process. She used this time to systematically document the situation and discovered major 
problems in the claim process. Many claims had not been properly processed and were waiting in 
different stages of the claim process, because they were forgotten, employees had de-prioritized 
them, and management decisions were needed. The new manager concluded that several 
immediate actions would be required. 
Period 4. As a first step, the new manager applied formal authority to implement and enforced 
simple rules that reduced complexity and introduced time limits for the execution of each of the 
claim tasks. In addition, for some product categories it was decided that all products older than 9 
months should not be repaired but rather replaced with new ones. Another example is that 
components with a value below 70 Euros were not repaired but simply replaced. Moreover, 
priority codes were re-defined to better serve different customer segments. In addition, a 
maximum duration of seven days was defined for many claim types. In this period, a high degree 
                                                            
5
 The next responsible manager was an extra level up in the hierarchy, and did effectively not want to be bothered 
with claims. 
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of formal authority was dedicated to the claims process and the discretion for routine participants 
was significantly reduced. While taking these steps, senior management also realized that the 
claim process could be further streamlined if the entire claim process would directly be overseen 
by only one manager. 
This was implemented in July 2009, when the quality function merged with after sales 
service which was overseen by the sales manager who was already responsible for the sales 
representatives who initiated and coordinated claim processes. With this change, a high degree of 
formal authority was focused on the entire claim process, and many of the previously occurring 
problems disappeared, because the manager could more easily identify cause-effect relationships 
in routine dynamics, and better address exception handling and employee training. Period four 
was, therefore, characterized by the new manager pulling back the control of the claims process 
to her own realm of influence, and consciously applying her formal authority while reducing the 
real authority of the routines participants.  
Measuring routine dynamics 
To measure variation over time in the action sequences that were used to deal with complaints, 
we employ the method pioneered by Pentland (Pentland, 2003a, 2003b; for applications see 
Pentland et al., 2009, 2010, 2011; Salvato, 2009a, 2009b). This method identifies the actions 
involved in carrying out a task (the lexicon of actions), and the sequences in which these actions 
are realized. To measure such variation, Pentland (2003a, b) developed the measure of sequential 
variety which derives from string matching approaches used in biology to compare DNA strings 
(Abbott, 1995). Sequential variety provides a measure that captures the extent to which a process 
or routine is performed in different ways (Pentland, 2003a, 2003b). For instance, in a restaurant, 
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these steps might involve the waiter bringing the menu, taking the order, serving drinks, serving 
the food, and presenting the bill. They might occur in different sequences, such as serving the 
food before drinks, etc. The sequential variety variable measures the variety in the sequences of 
steps that are used to accomplish the same task in a given time period. Pentland’s sequential 
variety measure compares the concrete sequences of actions across several instantiations in 
which the same task was accomplished. As Pentland et al. (2010) argue, this method can also be 
used to analyze whether patterns generated by a single routine are changing over time. The 
sequential variety measure is calculated by comparing the different sequences in which the same 
task was accomplished in a given time period and indicates how similar the sequences for 
carrying out the same task in the sample are and thus, variation in sequences for accomplishing 
the same task. To do so, optimal matching techniques (Abbott 1990, 1995) are applied, which 
directly measure sequence resemblance (Pentland 2003a, 2003b, Salvato, 2009b). For our dataset 
we compiled three types of sequential variety using three different time periods: Quarterly 
sequential variety (QSV) on the quarters used in accounting, monthly sequential variety (MSV) 
grounded on monthly time periods, and weekly sequential variety (WSV) constructed on weekly 
occurrences.  
Other variables 
Apart from sequential variety, the firm’s internal documentation allows for a straightforward 
identification of additional relevant variables (see also Table 2). Claim duration measures the 
time needed between the initiation of the claim process and the completion of it. SalesRep 
identifies the sales representative who initiates and oversees the claim process. ProductFamily 
refers to the firm’s three major product lines. MainItemGoup further distinguishes the products 
based on modularized components that are used across product lines. WarrantyCode separates 
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different warranty agreements that the firm offers. Priority Code allows the firm to fast-track 
claims from important customer firms. ErrorCode clusters the typical errors that the firm’s 
products have revealed during the last years. Quarter allocates each claim to the quarter in which 
it was initiated.  
Insert Table 2 here 
4) Results 
We start by looking at differences between the four periods in terms of the stability and change 
of the claim routine. The simplest way to examine its stability and change is shown in Figure 2 
which shows that all three sequential variety (SV) measures are not stable but change across time 
periods. Remarkable is that the overall WSV is lower than the MSV, which is lower than the 
QSV (see Table 3). For all time periods this difference is also statistically significant with 
p<0.001 (Mann Whitney U test). 
Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 here 
An explanation for the difference is that daily work during a week is relatively steadier and 
changes more slowly because the incoming claims are comparatively similar, i.e. there are no 
seasonal cycles and no individual product groups are more failure prone than others. Also 
notable are the changes over time as can be seen in Figure 2. While period two6 displays only 
limited variation, period three reveals a significant development: Sequential variety initially 
dropped slightly while then displaying a sharp increase. This reflects the changes concerning 
                                                            
6
 Note that we do not consider period 1 for advanced analysis since the documentation is inconsistent and partially 
incomplete. This is due to employees being unfamiliar with the new software system and the firm being partially 
unclear about what needed to be reported. 
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management authority in this period described above. The routine, having low degrees of 
management authority and being “left alone” self-develops variation in quarter 21 and 22 that 
exceeds any previous levels. In period 4 the sharp reduction in SV reflects the high degree of 
formal authority which was a reaction to the increased variation in the previous period. Senior 
management decided to oversee the routine “under one roof” and define authority clearly.  
In this context an important robustness check is whether the drastic changes in claim duration, 
i.e. the time between opening and closing a customer after-sales inquiry, may have an influence 
on SV. Figure 3 shows the changes in claim duration for the firm’s ten most used task sequences 
(covering ~75% of all cases). Again, period 2 remains fairly stable while period 3 shows clear 
variation towards the end. In period 4 the claim duration is significantly reduced, as expected.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
A more systematic analysis of routine dynamics is the comparison of SV within the three main 
time periods. Table 4a-c lists the mean SV on the weekly and monthly basis for all quarters. It 
also compares these means across quarters using a Mann Whitney U test. The most eminent 
insight is that in all time periods statistically significant differences can be found across the 
various quarters. Hence, routine dynamics are pre-eminent, rather than infrequent occurrences 
and routines are not stable over time when compared using SV as the measure.  
Insert Table 4a-c here 
We now turn to examining H1, which states that organizational routines to which a high degree 
of formal authority is applied are more stable over time than those to which a low degree of 
formal authority is applied. First, the regression analysis shows that time periods with different 
degrees of formal authority systematically display varying sequential variety on the monthly as 
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well as the weekly basis. This is no surprise given the above analysis. What is remarkable is that 
for both regressions (Table 5 and 6) the overall variance of sequential variety explained by the 
models, with the adjusted R-squared, substantially increases from period 2 to 3 and again from 
period 3 to 4. We also see that fewer and fewer variables are significant as management either 
addressed the issues discussed in the hypotheses section, or actively used some of the variables 
to instill organizationally desired variation in SV. Also, in the regressions for period 4 only very 
few variables remain significant. These results show that across time periods, managers have 
recognized which areas have caused routine dynamics and exercised their authority to either 
lower unwanted SV, or accept it as part of the firm’s business practice in a particular time period. 
Overall, the results clearly point to SV being a useful measure for managers to systematically 
think about routines. 
 
The further hypotheses are best examined using a regression analysis with WSV and MSV as 
dependent variables (Table 5 and 6). Several variables of interest are introduced as dummy 
variables which allows for a focused analysis of the role of each instance of all these variables. 
For convenience and to facilitate an easy presentation of the results, the hypotheses are discussed 
using the analysis in both regression tables simultaneously.  
Insert Table 5 and 6 here 
We start out by two observations. First, we already mentioned the role of claim duration as being 
a possibly relevant empirical factor that could shape routine dynamics. In fact we find that claim 
duration is not significant, as expected, in any of the models. Hence, the claims’ waiting time 
does not correlate with SV. Second, the frequency with which a routine is executed offers 
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interesting findings. While the variable is significant in most models, the signs of the coefficients 
change from WSV being negative to MSV being positive. The frequent practice of a routine 
lowers SV on the weekly basis but increases the SV on the monthly basis. This result may at first 
hand seem puzzling, but it reveals an important insight. A possible explanation is that frequent 
daily practice of some action sequences may have positive effects for weekly SV through 
learning but at the same time detrimental effects for SV on the monthly basis. Those effects can 
include boredom or repetitive fatigue among the employees that are participating in the routine. 
What is most interesting is that the significance level is reduced for WSV and we find 
insignificance for MSV for period 4. In this case, the sequence frequency does not explain MSV 
since management has eliminated those action sequences that were creating variation on this 
level. It suggests not only that the degree of formal authority in a specific time period is a 
significant determinant for the detection of routine dynamics, but also that timescales (monthly 
vs. weekly) are critical for how formal authority is practically applied in routines. In other words, 
managers can identify SV, in our case MSV, that is “below” the radar and which they do not 
(want to) detect, or they acknowledge as acceptable.  
Insert Figure 4 here 
Moving on to the next main area of interest, we now analyze the role of individual participants in 
an organizational routine. H4a states that individuals have an impact on routine dynamics, and 
H4b suggests that they do not have an impact. A first way to approach this question is comparing 
all 35 sales representatives and the mean SVs when they were executing a claim. If a few 
individuals would drastically disobey what the organization demands, it should show 
graphically. In fact, we do not find such a result, as Figure 4 shows. Except for very few cases, 
the overall differences seem moderate. However, the existence of differences already indicates 
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that there is more to the story. As the regression analysis for WSV shows for time periods 2 and 
3, some sales representatives are insignificant and others are not; particularly in period 3 many 
are significant. In period 4, all sales representatives are insignificant. The pattern of who is 
significant and who is not in period 2 and 3 is not obvious. Note that the prevalence of 
experienced sales representatives is not shaping these results, since those who often engage in 
the routines are not necessarily those with high significance levels (see Figure 5 to identify 
experienced sales representatives). For MSV we find insignificance in period 2 and some 
significance in period 3 and 4 (except for two individuals in the latter case). Overall we find 
support for hypotheses H4a and H4b, since there are time periods in which individual 
participants significantly change SV on all levels, and we also find instances in which their 
influence is very restricted (period 4). One main insight is that a general statement cannot be 
made, since the individuals’ role in determining SV depends on other factors, including 
individual-level as well as surrounding factors. Another main insight is that the degree of formal 
authority dedicated to the claims process in period 2 was sufficient to reduce routine dynamics 
on the monthly but not weekly basis. Limited formal authority in period 3 did not control 
routines dynamics at all, while dedicated formal authority was quite effective to reduce overall 
SV on the weekly and monthly basis. Hence, the degree of formal authority can significantly 
shape how routine dynamics occur within defined time periods. It also becomes clear that well 
defined managerial rules or other initiatives such as targeted training (to those who still create 
SV), can be effective for reducing routine dynamics. 
Insert Figure 5 here 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 again reveal interesting details across the time periods. For modularity (H3), 
which is measured with the variables ProductFamily and MainItemGoup, we find significance 
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across all time periods for WSV. Remarkable in this case is that the coefficients for significant 
results change from being positive in period 2 to being negative in period 3 and 4. A better and 
more consistent allocation of modularity types helped reduce SV. For MSV, the results are 
insignificant for period 2 and 4, but significant for period 3. Overall we find that modularity can 
significantly influence SV, and the degree of formal authority to the firm’s modularity can shape 
routine dynamics. Again we have instances that confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis H4a and 
4b. 
For quality management (H2) we find similar results. The variables WarrantyCode, 
PriorityCode, and ErrorCode capture this aspect. For WSV we find highly significant results in 
period 2 and insignificance in period 3 and 4. The very fact that all of the significant variables 
have a positive sign suggests that these variables were heavily used to create “unusual” 
processing, which management may have even supported, e.g. for exception handling. MSV has 
a few significant instances in period 2 and 3, and several significant results in period 4. Given the 
degree of formal authority dedicated to the routine in this time period (and her approach to 
“weeding out” SV as documented by the qualitative evidence) the error codes were creating 
instability in routine. Interestingly, the quality manager, at the end of her assignment to this 
routine, pointed out that error codes are the next important step to focus on (she said that before 
we conducted our regression analysis).  
 
5) Discussion and conclusion 
This paper sets out to study the role of hierarchical authority for routine dynamics by examining 
the sequential variety of a stereotypical routine over a 5 year period. The results allow for a 
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discussion of how managers can use formal and real authority to strategically go about the 
sources of routine dynamics. We find that routines are not stable, because of endogenous and 
exogenous sources of instability. In our dataset endogenous sources are the individual 
participants of routine, exogenous sources include the organization’s approaches to quality 
management and product modularity, as well as the degree of formal authority dedicated to the 
routine. In particular the latter provides important insights that are novel to the debate. While 
recent studies have already empirically shown the existence of routine dynamics (Pentland et al., 
2009, 2010, 2011), the present paper contributes by laying out distinct managerial measures that 
an organization can take to strategically influence routine dynamics. Several contributions and 
implications follow. 
First, the distinctive feature of our study is the explicit inclusion of two different types of 
authority, formal and real authority (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). The results on the impact of formal 
authority on routine dynamics extend prior knowledge on routine dynamics by identifying 
boundary conditions for exogenous and endogenous change of routines, and by shedding light on 
how exogenous and endogenous influences can managerially be manipulated to shape routine 
dynamics (Becker et al., 2005; Pentland & Feldman, 2008). We find that routines can change 
endogenously as long as they are ‘left alone’, and managers do not apply their formal authority 
to them. This situation is very common when frequently recurring tasks are standardized, 
delegated to subordinates (Cyert & March, 1963) and significant hierarchical authority is only 
deployed when handling exceptions. This represents a fundamental organizational principle 
which is rooted in the scarcity of managerial attention (Simon, 1947; Ocasio 2011). Note that 
even in a situation with considerable high-level managerial control, there generally is a range of 
flexibility within which the routine can change without management being involved (Becker et 
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al., 2005: 779). In such a situation, while managers hold the formal decision authority, the agents 
carrying out the routine have discretion and maintain real decision authority (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997) which can be the root causes of routine dynamics. Our results show that the degree of 
formal authority deployed to a routine shapes the extent to which change in routines can emerge, 
providing proof of concept of an idea that was present in the original contributions on 
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 109) but that has not yet been demonstrated or 
developed. This relationship seems crucial since it suggests a neglected lever that organization 
designers can use to shape the evolution of routines by deciding upon the allocation and 
distribution of formal and real authority in the organization.  
This insight contributes to the debate in various ways. Precisely in a situation where formal 
authority is employed only in a limited way, we find that routines do not stay stable but develop 
variation, thereby exhibiting pronounced routine dynamics. This is surprising because this is the 
paradigmatic case, for which the traditional idea of routines as being stable should hold. Hence, 
our study presents another empirical counter-example where the traditional standard case does 
not hold (Feldman, 2000; Pentland et al., 2011) and supports the view that routines can change, 
also endogenously (Feldman, 2000; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Further we identify formal 
authority as an important influence on the change of routines and a means for stabilizing 
routines. While this basic notion has already been mentioned (a) in the literature on business 
process reengineering (Hammer & Champy 1990) and (b) in a few theoretical contributions (e.g. 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Becker et al., 2005), we show that formal authority may be the key 
variable for explaining why changes in routines emerge and how decision makers may be able to 
go about them.  
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Second, we extend prior research on designing routines and shaping routine dynamics (Pentland 
& Feldman, 2008) by addressing the problems identified by Becker et al. (2005). On one hand, 
we lend support to the idea that sequential variety is an empirical measure that is useful for 
describing routine dynamics and identifying situations of high or low routine dynamics 
(Pentland, 2003a, 2003b). On the other hand, we identify and illustrate how the sequential 
variety measure can be used as a managerial tool that allows for reconfiguring routines. Thereby, 
we address the lack of inefficacies of instruments to influence actual processes and routines 
which earlier work pointed out (Becker at al 2005). By identifying sequential variety as an 
appropriate ‘target measure’ for how well formal authority is used within a routine, we provide 
an additional lever for managers to extend their influence on routine dynamics. This adds to 
levers identified in prior literature such as artifacts or IT (Pentland & Feldman, 2008), but also 
suggests that earlier work that points to the limitations of managerial influence (Becker et al 
2005) may have underrated possibilities that emerge when analyzing micro level routine 
structures. Formal authority does, therefore, provide an alternative that can particularly take into 
account behavioral and structural aspects of routine.  Our analysis not only introduces concrete 
ways to measure and analyze sequential variety, but also shows how managers can use the 
resulting insight for shaping routines and their dynamics. Specifically, our regression analysis 
allows for an unambiguous identification of concrete sources of routine dynamics, such as 
quality management or product standardization, which has been discussed as hard to measure in 
prior literature (e.g. Becker et al., 2005).  
We also identify the time scales in which managers employ their formal authority as a variable 
that is important for understanding routine dynamics. The results show that depending on what 
time scale (e.g., week, months, or quarters) is used, the values of the corresponding sequential 
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variety measure on the same data will be different. Thus, it is possible that managers can draw 
different conclusions from analyzing varying sequential variety measures. The choice of an 
appropriate time scale (Zaheer et al., 1999) for calculating sequential variety is therefore 
indispensable for any informed discussion of routine dynamics. Furthermore, we contribute to 
knowledge about how to shape routine dynamics through deploying formal authority by 
identifying a criterion for when to employ formal authority to routines. As Becker et al. (2005: 
779) point out, encouraging and putting in place criteria for stopping certain practices are 
important means for managerial intervention in routines. Our analysis suggests a specific 
criterion, i.e., threshold values for sequential variety that trigger a change in the deployment of 
formal authority, e.g. by pulling real decision authority back to the formal authority holder 
(Agion & Tirole, 1997). This is important because it allows informed managers to systematically 
define wanted and unwanted routine dynamics on various levels. For instance, a management 
team may deliberately decide to ignore weekly SV and only focus on monthly SV because these 
are the routine dynamics relevant in a particular business case. It may also decide to allow SV to 
emerge for some reasons but not for others, and administer corresponding training for the 
participants of a routine. Such strategic choices concerning routine dynamics are novel to the 
debate and important for formulating managerially useful advice concerning routines. 
We also acknowledge that our study has a series of limitations. Our data stems from one 
organization and as such has limited generalizability, e.g. we cannot assess what are in relative 
terms high or low levels of sequential variety. We also analyzed only one of the firm’s routines 
and not several. Our setting also does not allow for an assessment of the firm’s concrete business 
or performance impact of routine dynamics.  All of these are important questions and we leave 
them to future research. Our research has also identified promising research questions that 
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include, for instance, which other managerial interventions beyond the ones we measured can 
lead to diminishing routine dynamics?  
To conclude, this paper discusses routine dynamics by illustrating an apparent routine instability. 
Routine instability can be attributed to many sources and it is the task of an organization designer 
to identify those and consider appropriate action. This may include the acceptance of instability 
on some level but may also require severe actions to drastically limit routine dynamics. These 
actions can include well understood mechanisms of organization design, including modularity, 
process improvement or quality management, but also requires the consideration of the 
individual actors and their awareness of the consequences of their own behavior. Formal 
authority is core to understand routine dynamics and to administer actions suited for a purposeful 
organizational development. Limited formal authority may create high levels of variation in 
routine dynamics which may be useful to stimulate exploration in a R&D context. At the same 
time, applying formal authority to an organizational routine may be useful to create semi-stable 
SOPs useful in a production context. What is important is that routine dynamics are treated 
adequately in their particular context. While many studies have discussed routines conceptually, 
largely based on qualitative accounts, it seems that the field is ripe for complementary 
quantitative empirical approaches that consider both technical and behavioral aspects of routine 
dynamics. We hope our paper can be useful for following this path.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot with examples from the firm’s internal IT system 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sequential Variety (SV) is changing across time periods  
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Figure 3: The ten most frequently used routines, i.e. task sequences (covering ~75% of all cases), 
display significant changes in duration. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Overall mean sequential variety for all the firm’s sales representatives (measures SVs 
of all claims in which the person was participating) 
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Figure 5: Frequency with which individual participants engaged in specific instances of the 
routine (covering ~83% of all cases, with the 20 most frequent sequences) 
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Table 1: Actions within routines 
Process routine name Stage code Explanation 
Sales 1 Creation of reclamation order in the firm’s IT system 
Goods receive in 
warehouse 
2 Returned goods are registered in the firm’s IT system. 
Stock levels are updated 
SPV test 3 Experienced employee tests returned goods to assess 
failures. Test reports are administered in the IT system 
Crediting 4 Financial transfer to customer or between departments 
is initiated 
Goods received 
completed 
5 Goods receive claim numbers and lacking information 
is gathered  
Factory completion 6 Repair is completed. Information is sent to logistics 
and purchase departments. Customer is informed 
Claim code check  7 Employee checks claim description, change of fail 
code assignment if necessary  
Purchase 8 Purchase of spare parts if necessary 
Logistics 9 Shipment is prepared 
Closed 10 Employee confirms info within administration and 
closes the claim 
 
Table 2: Variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable name Type Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation
Explanation 
Claim duration scale 
0 713.18 77.67 76.90
Number of days between the 
opening and closing of a 
claim
Error text code discrete 0 93 42.71 27.37 Classification of technical 
errors 
M SV scale 0.00 1.64 1.30 0.17 Monthly sequential variety
Main item group discrete 1 2 4.99 3.64 Product categories
Period discrete 1 4 2.52 0.76 Time period with constant 
managerial attention
Priority  code discrete 1 5 4.48 1.28 Importance of claim
Product family discrete 1 3 2.92 0.391 Product types
Q SV scale 0.57 1.53 1.32 0.13 Quarterly sequential variety
Quarter discrete 1.00 27.00 13.08 7.00 3-month period
SalesRep discrete 1 35 18.60 9.87 Sales representative
Sequence 
Frequency 
discrete 
1 2394 1225.63 977.09 Frequency with which an action sequence occurred
W SV scale 0.00 2.09 1.22 0.26 Weekly sequential variety
Warranty  code discrete 1 4 3.03 0.78 Classification of warranty types
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Table 3: Mean sequential variety across time 
  
Weekly  
Sequential Variety 
Monthly  
Sequential Variety 
Quarterly 
Sequential Variety 
Time Period 1 0.9633 1.0570 1.0798 
2 1.2656 1.3363 1.3474 
3 1.2121 1.2925 1.3193 
4 1.2331 1.2844 1.3034 
 
Table 4: Comparisons of Column Means  
 
 
Comparisons of Column Means for Period 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
Quarter 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) 
Monthly 
Sequential 
Variety 
1.3216 
E F H 
1.4219 
A C D E F G H I 
J 
1.3522 
A E F H 
1.3896 
A C E F G H 
1.2597 1.3002 
E H 
1.3521 
A E F H 
1.2740 1.4134 
A C D E F G H 
J 
1.3982 
A C E F G H 
Weekly 
Sequential 
Variety 
1.2641 
E F H 
1.3757 
A C D E F G H 
1.2826 
D E F H 
1.2370 
E H 
1.1641 1.2298 
E H 
1.2737 
D E F H 
1.2012 
E 
1.3515 
A C D E F G H 
1.3596 
A C D E F G H 
 
Comparisons of Column Means for Period 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
Quarter 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) 
Monthly 
Sequential 
Variety 
1.4542 
B C D E F G 
1.2275 
D E F G 
1.2184 
E F G 
1.2141 
E F G 
1.1569 1.1760 
E 
1.1890 
E 
1.4701 
B C D E F G 
1.5082 
A B C D E F G H 
Weekly 
Sequential 
Variety 
1.3677 
B C D E F G 
1.1418 
D E 
1.1239 
D E 
1.0834 1.0631 1.1113 
D E 
1.1544 
C D E F 
1.3892 
B C D E F G 
1.4672 
A B C D E F G H 
 
Comparisons of Column Means for Period 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
Quarter 
23 24 25 26 27 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Monthly 
Sequential 
Variety 
1.4452 
B C D E 
1.3362 
C D E 
1.2388 
D E 
1.0726 
E 
.5500 
Weekly 
Sequential 
Variety 
1.4071 
B C D E 
1.2696 
C D E 
1.1825 
D E 
1.0301 
E 
.4927 
All results are based on two-sided tests assuming equal variances with significance level .05. For each significant pair, the key of the smaller 
category appears under the category with larger mean. 
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Table 5: OLS with weekly sequential variety as DV 
 
 
All Periods (4-27 Quarters) Period 2 (4-13 
 Quarters) 
Period 3 (14-22  
Quarters) 
Period 4 (23-27 Quarters)
VARIABLES 
         
ClaimDuration 3.17x10-6 (0.000) 2.62x10-5 (0.000) -05.56x10-5 (0.000) 4.82x10-5 (0.000)
SequenceFrequency -1.7x10-5*** (0.000) 2.38x10-6*** (0.000) -2.16x10-5*** (0.000) -1.23x10-5* (0.000)
1.SalesRep -0.029 (0.045)   0.093** (0.029) 0.030 (0.058)
2.SalesRep -0.147* (0.062) -0.008 (0.071) -0.120 (0.146)   
3.SalesRep -0.168*** (0.048) -0.109*** (0.029) 0.033 (0.085)   
4.SalesRep -0.498*** (0.121)   -0.425* (0.177)   
5.SalesRep -0.753*** (0.049) -0.082 (0.125) 0.304 (0.219)   
6.SalesRep -0.082* (0.041) 0.020 (0.014) -0.022 (0.035) 0.013 (0.063)
7.SalesRep -0.065 (0.042) 0.014 (0.022) 0.050* (0.025)   
8.SalesRep -0.067 (0.043)   0.074** (0.025) -0.024 (0.035)
9.SalesRep -0.058 (0.044)   0.056* (0.026)   
10.SalesRep -0.029 (0.042)   0.082*** (0.024) 0.046 (0.037)
11.SalesRep -0.034 (0.044)   0.079** (0.028) 0.069 (0.069)
12.SalesRep -0.100* (0.045)   0.027 (0.027)   
13.SalesRep -0.048 (0.042) 0.029 (0.018) 0.053* (0.025) 0.029 (0.034)
14.SalesRep -0.097* (0.042) -0.041* (0.017)     
15.SalesRep -0.005 (0.041) 0.037* (0.015) 0.129*** (0.023) -0.125 (0.176)
16.SalesRep -0.055 (0.040) 0.006 (0.013) 0.062** (0.022) 0.029 (0.035)
17.SalesRep -0.102* (0.042) -0.066* (0.027) 0.031 (0.022) -0.014 (0.037)
18.SalesRep -0.047 (0.043)   0.070** (0.024) 0.052 (0.054)
19.SalesRep -0.098* (0.045) -0.042 (0.024) 0.078 (0.100)   
20.SalesRep 
14 SalesRep insign. 
results 
-0.100* (0.048)   0.027 (0.033)   
1.Mainitemgroup 0.017* (0.008) 0.020 (0.012) 0.019 (0.013) 0.027 (0.021)
2.Mainitemgroup 0.011 (0.009) 0.030* (0.014) -0.014 (0.016) -0.038 (0.024)
3. Mainitemgroup -0.001 (0.008) 0.028* (0.012) -0.023 (0.013) 0.000 (0.022)
4.Mainitemgroup -0.004 (0.036) 0.045 (0.049) 0.031 (0.083) -0.248** (0.089)
5.Mainitemgroup 0.035 (0.020) 0.069** (0.025) -0.165 (0.112) 0.049 (0.103)
6.Mainitemgroup 
13 Mainitemgroup 
insign. results 
3 Productfamily 
insign. results 
-0.555** (0.214)   -0.544* (0.218)   
1.Warrantycode 
2 Warrantycode 
insign. results 
0.012 (0.014) 0.024* (0.012) -0.005 (0.023) -0.004 (0.027)
1.Prioritycode 
3 Prioritycode insign. 
results 
0.346*** (0.065) 0.346*** (0.071) 0.072 (0.219)   
1.Errortextcode 0.079** (0.027) 0.143** (0.047) 0.081 (0.055) 0.017 (0.045)
2.Errortextcode 0.070 (0.036) 0.157** (0.056) 0.050 (0.078) -0.102 (0.097)
3.Errortextcode 0.044 (0.026) 0.134** (0.046) 0.049 (0.055) -0.019 (0.051)
4.Errortextcode 0.056* (0.027) 0.094 (0.054) 0.058 (0.054) -0.012 (0.042)
5.Errortextcode 0.067 (0.037) 0.181** (0.057) 0.064 (0.076) -0.059 (0.098)
6.Errortextcode 0.055 (0.031) 0.138** (0.052) 0.029 (0.062) 0.035 (0.088)
7.Errortextcode 0.047 (0.029) 0.137* (0.061) 0.047 (0.056) -0.014 (0.048)
8.Errortextcode 0.041 (0.027) 0.129** (0.047) 0.080 (0.058) -0.010 (0.055)
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9.Errortextcode 0.047 (0.028) 0.118* (0.049) 0.070 (0.058) 0.007 (0.056)
10.Errortextcode 0.095** (0.033) 0.176*** (0.052) 0.088 (0.073) -0.007 (0.129)
11.Errortextcode 0.071* (0.030)   0.057 (0.057) 0.018 (0.052)
12.Errortextcode 0.094 (0.063) 0.162* (0.083) -0.147 (0.225) 0.014 (0.130)
13.Errortextcode 0.047 (0.026) 0.137** (0.046) 0.031 (0.055) -0.018 (0.046)
14.Errortextcode 0.032 (0.049) 0.151* (0.071) -0.016 (0.085)   
15.Errortextcode 0.062* (0.028) 0.157*** (0.048) 0.055 (0.060) -0.130 (0.078)
16.Errortextcode 0.035 (0.037) 0.162* (0.064) 0.010 (0.068) -0.044 (0.060)
17.Errortextcode 0.052 (0.027) 0.147** (0.047) 0.036 (0.056) -0.022 (0.061)
18.Errortextcode 0.008 (0.040) 0.158* (0.061) -0.078 (0.073)   
19.Errortextcode 0.047 (0.035) 0.138* (0.055) 0.035 (0.069) 0.204 (0.130)
20.Errortextcode 0.047 (0.030) 0.150** (0.049) -0.020 (0.062) 0.097 (0.067)
21.Errortextcode 0.031 (0.029) 0.124* (0.051) 0.017 (0.058) 0.029 (0.056)
22.Errortextcode 0.079** (0.029) 0.188*** (0.049) 0.026 (0.069) 0.068 (0.083)
23.Errortextcode 0.012 (0.029) 0.112* (0.050) -0.028 (0.059) -0.032 (0.056)
24.Errortextcode 
32 Errortextcode 
insign. results 
0.090 (0.073) 0.192* (0.094) 0.070 (0.138)   
1.Quarter 0.164*** (0.023)       
2.Quarter 0.268*** (0.023)       
3.Quarter 0.381*** (0.022) 0.109*** (0.014)     
4.Quarter 0.286*** (0.022) 0.015 (0.014)     
5.Quarter 0.237*** (0.023) -0.035* (0.015)     
6.Quarter 0.153*** (0.023) -0.104*** (0.016)     
7.Quarter 0.212*** (0.023) -0.040** (0.015)     
8.Quarter 0.242*** (0.022) -0.008 (0.015)     
9.Quarter 0.173*** (0.023) -0.081*** (0.016)     
10.Quarter 0.346*** (0.023) 0.100*** (0.017)   
11.Quarter 0.359*** (0.023) 0.111*** (0.017)     
12.Quarter 0.356*** (0.023)       
13.Quarter 0.129*** (0.024)   -0.217*** (0.016)   
14.Quarter 0.112*** (0.024)   -0.226*** (0.016)   
15.Quarter 0.061** (0.023)   -0.285*** (0.016)   
16.Quarter 0.051* (0.023)   -0.291*** (0.016)   
17.Quarter 0.105*** (0.024)   -0.234*** (0.017)   
18.Quarter 0.149*** (0.024)   -0.189*** (0.017)   
19.Quarter 0.362*** (0.024)   0.022 (0.017)   
20.Quarter 0.435*** (0.024)   0.092*** (0.017)   
21.Quarter 0.375*** (0.025)   
22.Quarter 0.240*** (0.025)     -0.136*** (0.014)
23.Quarter 0.158*** (0.025)     -0.221*** (0.014)
24.Quarter 0.000 (0.027)     -0.372*** (0.017)
25.Quarter -0.545*** (0.050)     -0.907*** (0.041)
26. Quarter 0.000 (0.027)     -0.372*** (0.017)
27. Quarter -0.545*** (0.050)     -0.907*** (0.041)
Constant 1.101*** (0.065) 1.052*** (0.104) 1.423*** (0.150) 1.414*** (0.059)
         
Observations 11,581  4,925  4,287  1,219  
R-squared 0.338  0.146  0.359  0.522  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Explanation: Apart from the variable ClaimDuration and SequenceFrequency, all variables are introduced 
as dummies. To shorten the length of the table, all instances without significance are summarized in one 
row which is displayed in italics. 
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Table 6: OLS with monthly sequential variety as DV 
 
All Periods (4-27 Quarters) Period 2 (4-13 
 Quarters) 
 
Period 3 (14-22  
Quarters) 
Period 4 (23-27 Quarters)
VARIABLES 
         
Claimduration 3.39x10-5 (0.000) 5.97x10-5 (0.000) 8.34x10-5 (0.000) 1.5111x10-4 (0.000) 
SequenceFrequency 1.29x107*** (0.000) 4.93106*** (0.000) 9.53x10-6*** (0.000) 9.79x10-6 (0.000) 
1.SalesRep -0.053** (0.020)       
2.SalesRep -0.050* (0.022) 0.006 (0.010)     
3.SalesRep -0.061** (0.022)   0.026 (0.017) 0.062* (0.026) 
4.SalesRep -0.066* (0.029)   0.068 (0.080) 0.001 (0.021) 
5.SalesRep 0.055 (0.035)   0.201* (0.084)   
6.SalesRep -0.050* (0.020) 0.007 (0.005) 0.115 (0.081)   
7.SalesRep -0.055** (0.021) -0.007 (0.007) 0.126*** (0.037)   
8.SalesRep -0.025 (0.023) 0.005 (0.011) 0.178*** (0.049)   
9.SalesRep -0.302*** (0.060)   -0.151 (0.102)   
10.SalesRep -0.129*** (0.024) -0.013 (0.046) 0.177 (0.126)   
11.SalesRep -0.061 (0.033) -0.011 (0.022)     
12.SalesRep -0.050* (0.020) 0.008 (0.005) 0.022 (0.020) -0.035 (0.028) 
13.SalesRep -0.058* (0.025)     -0.010 (0.018) 
14.SalesRep -0.053* (0.021) 0.003 (0.008) 0.045** (0.014)   
15.SalesRep -0.043* (0.021)   0.062*** (0.014) -0.010 (0.016) 
16.SalesRep -0.063** (0.022)   0.042** (0.015)   
17.SalesRep -0.041* (0.020)   0.054*** (0.014) -0.015 (0.016) 
18.SalesRep -0.040 (0.022)   0.061*** (0.016) 0.026 (0.031) 
19.SalesRep 0.049 (0.059)   0.199* (0.101)   
20.SalesRep -0.044* (0.022)   0.058*** (0.015)   
21.SalesRep -0.054** (0.020) -0.012 (0.007) 0.049*** (0.014) -0.005 (0.015) 
22.SalesRep -0.051* (0.020) -0.001 (0.006)     
23.SalesRep -0.029 (0.020) 0.003 (0.006) 0.084*** (0.013) 0.050 (0.078) 
24.SalesRep -0.042* (0.020) 0.004 (0.005) 0.060*** (0.013) 0.003 (0.016) 
25.SalesRep -0.066** (0.020) -0.010 (0.010) 0.041** (0.013) -0.035* (0.017) 
26.SalesRep -0.050* (0.021)   0.051*** (0.014) 0.021 (0.024) 
27.SalesRep -0.220* (0.086)   -0.146 (0.135)   
28.SalesRep -0.051* (0.021)   0.049** (0.016) -0.013 (0.016) 
29.SalesRep -0.026 (0.022) 0.011 (0.009) 0.168** (0.057)   
30.SalesRep -0.064** (0.024)   0.041* (0.019)   
31.SalesRep 
3 SalesRep insign. 
results 
0.055 (0.042)   0.198** (0.075)   
1.Mainitemgroup 0.010* (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 0.021 (0.012) 0.022 (0.012) 
2.Mainitemgroup 0.009* (0.004) 0.007 (0.004) 0.014 (0.007) 0.018 (0.009) 
3.Mainitemgroup -0.006 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) -0.018* (0.009) 0.000 (0.011) 
4.Mainitemgroup -0.007 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) -0.021** (0.007) 0.005 (0.010) 
5.Mainitemgroup -0.149** (0.053)   -0.182* (0.073) -0.090 (0.078) 
14 Mainitemgroup 
insign. results 
        
3 Productfamily 
insign. results 
        
4.Prioritycode -0.040 (0.032) -0.057* (0.026) 0.068 (0.126)   
5.Prioritycode 
2 Priority code insing. 
Results 
-0.007 (0.004) -0.004 (0.005) -0.019* (0.009) -0.006 (0.010) 
1.Errortextcode 
2. errortextcode 
0.035* 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
(0.005) 
0.084 
0.084 
(0.045) 
(0.045) 
0.076 
0.076 
(0.043) 
(0.043) 
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3.Errortextcode 0.026 (0.014) -0.009 (0.023) 0.043 (0.032) 0.043* (0.021) 
4.Errortextcode -0.053* (0.022) -0.047 (0.039) 0.021 (0.037)
5.Errortextcode 0.001 (0.013) -0.015 (0.017) 0.052 (0.034) 0.050* (0.025) 
6.Errortextcode 0.033* (0.015)   0.047 (0.033) 0.025 (0.023) 
7.Errortextcode 0.038 (0.025)   0.044 (0.057) 0.056* (0.026) 
8.Errortextcode 0.077 (0.039)   0.072 (0.057) 0.157* (0.079) 
9.Errortextcode 0.036 (0.023)   0.049 (0.040) 0.091* (0.040) 
10.Errortextcode 0.025 (0.034) -0.128** (0.049) 0.101 (0.060) 0.082 (0.058) 
11.Errortextcode -0.002 (0.031) -0.076* (0.035) 0.079 (0.058)   
12.Errortextcode 
45 Errortextcode 
insign. results 
0.017 (0.015) 0.005 (0.018) 0.008 (0.035) 0.060* (0.030) 
1.Quarter -0.109*** (0.011)       
2.Quarter 0.038*** (0.011)       
3.Quarter 0.173*** (0.011)       
4.Quarter 0.274*** (0.011) 0.100*** (0.005)     
5.Quarter 0.204*** (0.011) 0.030*** (0.005)     
6.Quarter 0.243*** (0.011) 0.066*** (0.006)     
7.Quarter 0.111*** (0.011) -0.060*** (0.006)     
8.Quarter 0.148*** (0.011) -0.021*** (0.006)     
9.Quarter 0.197*** (0.011) 0.032*** (0.006)     
10.Quarter 0.124*** (0.011) -0.045*** (0.006)     
11.Quarter 0.259*** (0.011) 0.092*** (0.006)     
12.Quarter 0.247*** (0.011) 0.079*** (0.006)     
13.Quarter 0.296*** (0.011)       
14.Quarter 0.080*** (0.012)   -0.206*** (0.009)   
15.Quarter 0.069*** (0.012)   -0.212*** (0.009)   
16.Quarter 0.063*** (0.011) -0.225*** (0.009)  
17.Quarter 0.010 (0.012)   -0.273*** (0.009)   
18.Quarter 0.030* (0.012)   -0.249*** (0.010)   
19.Quarter 0.044*** (0.012)   -0.235*** (0.010)   
20.Quarter 0.317*** (0.012)   0.033** (0.010)   
21.Quarter 0.353*** (0.012)   0.067*** (0.010)   
22.Quarter 0.289*** (0.012)       
23.Quarter 0.179*** (0.012)     -0.107*** (0.006) 
24.Quarter 0.083*** (0.012)     -0.202*** (0.006) 
25.Quarter -0.086*** (0.013)     -0.367*** (0.008) 
26.Quarter -0.618*** (0.024)     -0.888*** (0.018) 
     
Constant 1.213*** (0.032) 1.326*** (0.039) 1.352*** (0.086) 1.412*** (0.026) 
         
Observations 11,581  4,925  4,287  1,219  
R-squared 0.606  0.324  0.571  0.836  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Explanation: Apart from the variable ClaimDuration and SequenceFrequency, all variables are introduced 
as dummies. To shorten the length of the table, all instances without significance are summarized in one 
row which is displayed in italics. 
 
 
